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THE IMPORTANCE OF CORRECT
INVENTORSHIP
I. INTRODUCTION
Based on the Constitution's grant of power to Congress to promote
science, a patent can be issued only to its inventors.' If the patent application
or the issued patent contains an incorrect listing of inventors, the patent
could be invalid.2 Further, even if inventorship is corrected,3 the patent may
be practically invalid against a particular alleged infringer. The latter
situation is best illustrated by Ethicon, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp.4
Because inventorship in Ethicon, Inc.'s (Ethicon) patent was incorrectly
determined and stated at the time the patent issued, United States Surgical
Corp. (U.S. Surgical) was able to get a license to the unnamed inventor's
rights in the invention.' The court permitted correction of inventorship,
thus supporting patent validity; however, because the non-joined inventor
had granted a license to U.S. Surgical, Ethicon could not sue U.S. Surgical for
infringement, making the patent "practically invalid" with respect to U. S.
Surgical. Had Ethicon realized that the unnamed individual was an inventor,
it could have avoided this problem by obtaining an assignment from this
inventor. Thus, knowledge of who should be named on a patent application
' U.S. CONST. art. I, 5 8, cl. 8. "[Congress shall have the power] [t]o promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their . . .
Discoveries." This requirement was integrated by Congress into the Patent Act. See 35 U.S.C. 55 101,
111 (1994) (requiring that patents be issued to an inventor, i.e., the person who invented the subject
matter).
2 See infra Part V.A (discussing the requirement of lack of deceptive intent in the correction of
inventorship errors). Though sections 116 and 256 of the Patent Act were amended in 1982 to allow for
correction of inventorship in more situations, thus making correction an easier process, each section
requires a lack of deceptive intent for the correction of inventorship errors. 35 U.S.C. S5 116,256 (1994).
If deceptive intent is present on the part of the true "inventive entity," then correction will not be allowed
and the patent will be invalid.
See infra Part V (discussing 35 U.S.C. 55 116, 256 regarding correction of inventorship).
Ethicon, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456,45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545 (Fed. Cir.
1998), cert. denied 119 S. Ct. 278 (1998).
' Such a situation is less likely to arise in the case of a copyrighted work because copyright law states
that in cases of works made for hire, the author is the employer, not the employee who created the work.
17 U.S.C. 5 201(b) (1994). In contrast, patent law does not recognize such a concept and thus employers
typically require their employees to assign their rights in any patents which result from their employment
to the employer (the assignee). If such assignments are not made, as occurred in Ethicon, Inc., the inventor
may do as he pleases with his rights; he can even assign them to a competitor.
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as an inventor can prevent complications during interferences and/or
infringement proceedings. Further, a correct determination of inventorship
may save one's patent from "absolute" or "practical" invalidation.
This Note will examine (1) how inventorship is determined, (2) the effect
of the 1984 Patent Act Amendments on determinations of joint
inventorship, (3) the collaboration requirement of joint inventorship, (4)
how inventorship is corrected in an issued patent and a pending application,
(5) the rights of joint inventors as cotenants, and (6) a resolution of the
problems presented by Ethicon, Inc.
II. DEFINING INVENTORSHIP
A patent is issued to an "inventorship entity," which can consist of either
sole or joint inventor(s).6 Though inventorship has two parts, conception
and reduction to practice, determinations of inventorship are based primarily
on the conception of the invention! Therefore, sole inventorship occurs
when one person conceives of the solution to a problem, which constitutes
the subject matter of the invention, and joint inventorship results when
more than one person contributes to the conception of the solution.
Defining what constitutes "conception" will be examined below.
A. CONCEPTION
Determinations regarding conception often arise in interference
proceedings' or as a defense to an accusation of patent infringement. In
6 "Joint inventors" can also be called "co-inventors."
See Robert W. Harris, Conceptual Specificity as a Factor in Determination oflnventorship, 67 J. PAT.
& TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 315, 315-16 (1985) (stating that
[f]requently, the fact of actual or constructive reduction to practice will not be a
serious issue when patent counsel is evaluating an inventorship problem.... If, for
example, counsel has drafted a patent application which adequately discloses and
claims what appears to be a useful, novel and nonobvious invention, counsel can
reasonably expect that reduction to practice will occur constructively on the date the
application is filed. His... decision is accordingly focused upon conception)
(emphasis in original); see also Sewall v. Walters, 21 F.3d 411,415, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1356, 1358 (Fed.
Cir. 1994) (stating that "[d]etermining 'inventorship' is nothing more than determining who conceived
the subject matter at issue").
' An interference may occur between two pending applications or between a pending application
and an issued, unexpired patent. The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) will call for an interference
when "an application is made for a patent which.., would interfere with any pending application, or
[Vol. 7:191
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interferences, this determination must be made in two situations: (1) when
a claim of priority based on prior conception is made, or (2) during a
determination of the correct inventive entity. In infringement actions,
defendants often assert that the patent at issue is invalid due to an error in
inventorship.
Conception has been identified as the "touchstone of inventorship,"9 yet
courts have had difficulty enunciating a clear and precise test. Though the
Patent Act was amended in 1984,1" these amendments were not directed to
the conception requirement. Thus a review of cases both before and after
the 1984 Amendments can be helpful in delineating a definition of
conception.
B. CONCEPTION, AS DESCRIBED IN MUELLER BRASS CO. V. READING
INDUSTRIES, INC. AND IN BURROUGHS WELLCOME CO. V. BARR LABORATORIES,
INC.
In Mueller Brass Co. v. Reading Industries, Inc.," the court discussed the
conception requirement while defining joint inventorship:
To claim inventorship is to claim at least some role in
the final conception of that which is sought to be
patented. Perhaps one need not be able to point to a
specific component as one's sole idea, but one must be
able to say that without his contribution to the final
conception, it would have been less-less efficient, less
simple, less economical, less something of benefit. 2
Robert W. Harris has criticized the "Mueller Brass test" as inaccurately
supporting the proposition that a general contribution to the conception of
with any unexpired patent..." 35 U.S.C. S 135(a) (1994). An examiner may declare an interference or
an applicant may initiate one (upon discovery of a newly-issued United States or foreign patent that claims
the same invention). See ADELMAN ET AL., PATENT LAW 322 (1998).
' Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Lab., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1227, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1915, 1919
(Fed. Cir. 1994).
1" See infra Part I (discussing the 1984 Amendments and how they affect joint inventorship
determinations).
" Mueller Brass Co. v. Reading Indus., Inc., 352 F. Supp. 1357, 176 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 361 (E.D. Pa.
1972) afld 487 F.2d 1395, 180 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 547 (3d Cir. 1973).
12 Id. at 1372.
1999]
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the invention is required." In his analysis of the conception requirement,
Harris stated that courts look for "conceptual specificity" in inventorship
determinations.' 4 Harris concluded that "the more specific the conception
of a putative inventor or co-inventor, in terms of structural details or details
of process steps, the more likely such a person is an inventor or co-inventor,
other things being equal.""5 That is, if the standard of proof for conception
were the same for the defendant and for the plaintiff, then one would find
a requirement of conceptual specificity. 6
The traditional test for whether a person has conceived of an invention
is "[w]hether the inventor had an idea that was definite and permanent
enough that one skilled in the art could understand the invention."" The
parameters of this test can be better understood by looking at the application
of it by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit). 8 In
Burroughs Wellcome Co., a pharmaceutical manufacturer brought a patent
infringement action with respect to six patents relating to various methods
of using azidothymidine (AZT) to treat individuals with human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV). 9 The Federal Circuit held that National
Institute of Health (NIH) scientists were not co-inventors with respect to
" Harris, supra note 7, at 3i9-20 (stating that this can be "misleading dicta" when you examine the
specific holding and facts of the case).
" Id at 322. Harris closely analyzed the following cases: Land v. Dreyer, 155 F.2d 383, 69 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 602 (C.C.P.A. 1946); Polye v. Uhl, 328 F.2d 893, 140 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 584 (C.C.P.A. 1964);
Garrett Corp. v. United States, 422 F.2d 874, 164 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 521 (Ct. Cl. 1970); Amax Fly Ash
Corp. v. United States, 514 F.2d 1041,185 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 437 (Ct. Cl. 1975); Morgan v. Hirsch, 728 F.2d
1449, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
" Harris, supra note 7, at 333 (emphasis in original).
16 However, the standards are different. Once a patent issues, it is presumed to be valid. Thus, a
defendant must produce clear and convincing evidence to prove that the inventorship is incorrect. This
presumption exists because the PTO has the primary responsibility of "sift[ing] out unpatentable
material." SAB Industri AB v. Bendix Corp., 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 95, 102 (E.D. Va. 1978); see 35 U.S.C.
§ 282 (Supp. I1. 1997) (stating that "[a] patent shall be presumed valid").
17 Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Lab., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1228, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1915, 1919
(Fed. Cir. 1994); see also Sewall v. Walters, 21 F.3d 411,415, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1356, 1359 (Fed. Cir.
1994) ("Conception is complete when one of ordinary skill in the art could construct the apparatus
without unduly extensive research or experimentation."); Coleman v. Dines, 754 F.2d 353, 359, 224
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 857, 862 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (quoting Mergenthaler v. Scudder, 11 App. D.C. 264,276 (App.
D.C. 1897), which defined conception as "the complete performance of the mental part of the inventive
act. It is... the formation, in the mind of the inventor of a definite and permanent idea of the complete
and operative invention") (emphasis omitted).
"A The Federal Circuit refers to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which was
created in 1982 to replace both the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A.) and
the Court of Claims.
" Burroughs. Wellcome Co., 40 F.3d at 1225, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1917.
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inventions regarding compositions containing AZT and methods of using
AZT to treat acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS).2" However, the
court held that the NIH scientists could be co-inventors of the subject matter
in the patent pertaining to the use of AZT to increase the number of T-
lymphocytes in humans infected with HIV.
Based on the pharmaceutical manufacturer's request, the NIH scientists
had performed tests which confirmed that AZT was effective against HIV.
In this case, the date of conception of the invention became a significant
issue: had the Burroughs Wellcome Co. inventors conceived of the invention
before they asked the NIH scientists to perform tests?22 The Federal Circuit
held that conception required the inventor "to describe his invention with
particularity."23 This requirement ensured that the inventor possessed a
"complete mental picture of the invention."24  The court distinguished
conception from reduction to practice. It stated that the conception
requirement does not include knowledge that the invention will work; such
knowledge is part of the reduction to practice.25 In reaching its decision, the
court noted that the Burroughs Wellcome Co. (Burroughs Wellcome)
inventors had thought of the particular antiviral agent with which they
intended to treat ADS before the NIH scientists confirmed AZT was active
against HIV. Thus, the court found that with respect to the five patents
drawn to the compositions containing AZT and methods of using AZT to
treat AIDS, the Burroughs Wellcome scientists had conceived of the full
invention. 26
C. REQUIREMENT OF CORROBORATION
Because conception is purely a mental activity, courts have routinely
required corroborating evidence to support an allegation of conception.'
25 Id. at 1231.
21 Id. at 1232.
22 Id. at 1228.
23 Id.
24 Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Lab., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1228, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1915, 1919
(Fed. Cir. 1994).
25 Id. at 1228.
26 Id. at 1230.
27 See id. at 1228 (citing Coleman v. Dines, 754 F.2d 353,359,224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 857, 862 (Fed. Cir.
1985), to state that because conception is "a mental act, courts require corroborating evidence of a
contemporaneous disclosure that would enable one skilled in the art to make the invention").
1999]
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This is a well-established requirement. In Mergenthaler v. Scudder, the court
explained the corroboration requirement as follows:
[c]onception by an inventor .. .can not [sic] be
proved by his mere allegation nor by his unsupported
testimony, where there has been no disclosure to
others or embodiment of the invention in some
clearly perceptible form, such as drawings or
model . . . For otherwise[,] such facile means of
establishing priority of invention would, in many
cases, offer great temptation to perjury, and would
have the effect of virtually precluding the adverse
party from the possibility of rebutting such
evidence. 2
8
Though Mergenthaler establishes that some amount of corroboration is
required, it does not provide much direction for determining the necessary
amount or type of corroborating evidence that is needed to support a claim
of correct or incorrect inventorship.
1. Sufficient Corroboration. The amount and type of corroboration
needed to support a claim of inventorship can be determined by examining
a few case holdings. In Burroughs Wellcome Co., the court emphasized the
importance of supporting the "alleged conception" through the use of
corroborating evidence. 29 There, the court found the draft of a patent
application to be sufficient corroborating evidence of the named Burroughs
Wellcome inventors' definite and complete conception of the invention.30
By contrast, in a defendant's claim of non-joinder, a memorandum was
insufficient evidence of conception. In Garrett Corp. v. United States, the
patent at issue related to a boarding ramp which could be used to board a
' Mergenthaler v. Scudder, 11 App. D.C. 264, 278 (App. D.C. 1897).
Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Lab., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1230,32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1915, 1921
(Fed. Cir. 1994) (stating "ofcourse, the alleged conception must be supported by corroborating evidence")
(emphasis added).
-' See id (noting that the draft disclosed in detail the use of AZT to treat AIDS: it set out the
compound's structure, how to use AZT to treat a patient with HIV, dosages, dose forms, and routes of
administration).
[Vol. 7:191
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portable life raft. 1 The defendant claimed that a second inventor had
contributed to claim 3, which related to placing access ports in the water
ballast pocket above the normal water line.32 To support his inventorship
claim, the defendant offered a memorandum in which the 'sole' inventor had
stated that his co-worker had suggested the idea of using the water ballast
pocket in conjunction with the boarding ramp.3 This broad idea was found
to be obvious in light of the prior art.34 The Court of Claims35 found that
although the co-worker had "suggested the broad idea of a water ballast
pocket for use in conjunction with a boarding ramp,"36 he had not
contributed to the more "refined" details of the invention, i.e., locating the
water ballast pocket above the water line; thus, he was not a co-inventor.
Further, the court noted that the co-worker could not recall making the
suggestion. Therefore, even had the court found the co-worker to be a joint
inventor, he could not have made an oath as to joint inventorship, as
required by 35 U.S.C. S 256, to correct the inventorship."
In cases in which the court has upheld the inventorship as proper,
corroborating evidence that generally defines the claimed invention has
sufficed. By contrast, to prove non-joinder or misjoinder, as discussed above,
proof that more specifically defines the invention is required. The lower
standard of proof for upholding the named inventor is based on the
presumption that inventorship as stated in the patent is correct. Further, in
the context of an infringement action, when the defense of non-joinder or
misjoinder is used, courts generally look upon the defense with disfavor
because it is a "technical" defense; thus, the courts require clear and
3 Garrett Corp. v. United States, 422 F.2d 874, 876-77, 164 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 521, 523-24 (Ct. Cl.
1970) (describing the Walker patent boarding ramp).
32 Id at 879. Water ballast pockets were traditionally placed on each side of life rafts below the
normal water level of the raft. These pockets would fill with water immediately when the raft was put
afloat and remain filled as long as the raft was in an upright position. These pockets stabilized the raft by
minimizing drift and by resisting overturn. By contrast, in claim 3, the water ballast pockets were placed
on the boarding ramp above the normal water line. Thus, when these pockets filled with water, the ramp
end was lowered and filled. Some of the water in the pocket remained above the ramp water line, thereby
adding weight, and thus stability, to the raft.
I ld. at 880.
3' Id. at 881.
s The Court of Claims is the predecessor to the Federal Circuit. See supra note 18 (discussing the
creation of the Federal Circuit).
" Garrett Corp. v. United States, 422 F.2d 874, 881, 164 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 521, 527 (Ct. C1. 1970).
" Id at 881 n.5. See in/ra Part V (discussing Correction of Inventorship Errors).
1999]
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convincing proof to sustain such a defense.38 An example of the application
of the lower standard of proof can be found in Mueller Brass Co. v. Reading
Industries, Inc. " There the court found that an individual's general discussion
of a method with another inventor, along with the presence of the
individual's name on the patent, was sufficient corroborating evidence of
proper joinder of inventors.4" The court noted that traditionally "courts
have been reluctant to strike down patents for non-joinder on challenges by
third party infringers."4
D. WHAT DOES NOT MEET THE CONCEPTION REQUIREMENT
Though a precise test for conception has not been clearly defined by the
courts, some courts have identified factors which do not contribute to a
determination that conception of the invention had occurred. Four factors
that do not contribute to a finding of conception are (1) "mere suggestions,"
(2) "employee improvement," (3) belief that the invention will work, and (4)
knowledge of the result to be obtained.
The doctrine of "mere suggestions" denies co-inventorship status to a
person who casually suggests an improvement to an invention but who does
not work to fit it into the invention.42 This doctrine appears to reward the
individual who labors to create the final, complete invention. Under the
doctrine of "employee improvement," an employee engaged in experiments
to perfect another's experiments is not a co-inventor "unless the
improvement is so significant as to amount to 'a complete invention' in and
of itself."43 This doctrine has only been applied to save patents which are
Mueller Brass Co. v. Reading Indus., Inc., 352 F. Supp. 1357, 1372, 176 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 361, 372
(E.D. Pa. 1972).
352 F. Supp. 1357, 176 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 361 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
Id. at 1374 (stating that because Feuslein was listed on the patent as a co-inventor, even though the
court could find no corroborating evidence that he had conceived of the invention, he was considered to
be a joint inventor of the method. The court explained that its finding of proper joinder was based on
the high standard for proving misjoinder. It stated that "the Court would have little trouble finding
Feuslein not to be an inventor of the method" if the standard of proof, i.e., clear and convincing evidence,
were not so high).
41 Id. at 1372-73.
42 Id. at 1373.
4 Mueller Brass Co. v. Reading Indus., Inc., 352 F. Supp. 1357, 1373, 176 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 361, 372
(E.D. Pa. 1972) (citing Agawam Woolen Co. v. Jordan, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 583, 603 (1869)).
[Vol. 7:191
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attacked for non-joinder and has not been applied to defeat a patent for
misjoinder."
The Federal Circuit stated that the test for conception does not require
that an inventor believe that his invention will work.45 Thus, in Burroughs
Wellcome Co., the court rejected the defendant's argument that the
Burroughs Wellcome scientists had not conceived of the invention prior to
learning the test results from the NIH scientists because the Burroughs
Wellcome scientists had not known that AZT was in fact active against HIV
until then.46
The Federal Circuit's predecessor, the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals (C.C.P.A.), held that merely conceiving of the "result to be
obtained" does not meet the requirement of conception.47 Land v. Dreyer
arose as an interference proceeding over an invention for an incandescent
lamp with a coating made of a light-polarizing material and a filament light
source.48 The interference concerned a determination of priority, and thus
the court determined when each party had conceived of the invention.
Land appealed the Board of Interference Examiners of the United States
Patent and Trademark Office's (PTO) award of priority to Dreyer. The
dispositive issue was whether Land had conceived of certain aspects of the
invention prior to the July 2, 1938 filing date of Dreyer's patent
application.4 9 The court noted that since 1929 Land had been thinking about
the idea that "it would be desirable to apply a polarizing material directly
onto an incandescent lamp."" However, because he could not prove that he
had found a polarizing material for the lamp prior to Dreyer's filing date, his
conception was not "complete and operative"; therefore Land was not the
inventor.51
" Mueller Brass Co., 352 F. Supp. at 1374, 176 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 373-74. This fact further
demonstrates the effect of the different standards of proof for the plaintiff and defendant in infringement
actions. See supra Part lI.C for examples.
4' Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Lab., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1228, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1915, 1920-
21 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citing MacMillan v. Moffett, 432 F.2d 1237, 1239, 167 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 550, 552
(C.C.P.A. 1970)).
Burroughs Wellcome Co., 40 F.3d at 1227, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1920-21.
47 Landv. Dreyer, 155 F.2d 383,387,69 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 602, 605 (C.C.P.A. 1946).
48 Id.
'9 Id. at 384.
10 Id. at 387.
"* Cf Harris, supra note 7, at 322-24 (discussing Land v. Dreyer and noting that it appears that Land's
conception was sufficiently complete to have been awarded priority because the court noted that it was
accepted that Land "had in mind a filament light source encompassed within a non-planar envelope or that
1999]
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E. DOCTRINE OF SIMULTANEOUS CONCEPTION AND REDUCTION TO
PRACTICE
The doctrine of simultaneous conception and reduction to practice has
been applied in cases concerning inventions of new biotherapeutic gene
sequences.5 2 This doctrine stands for the idea that separating conception
from reduction to practice is impossible when an inventor must perform
experiments before confirming that the idea results in a successful invention.
Though this doctrine initially appeared as a separate standard for
conception, 3 the Federal Circuit has clarified it and established that only one
standard for conception exists. In Burroughs Wellcome Co., the Federal
Circuit explained that the doctrine of simultaneous conception and reduction
to practice merely applies when the inventor cannot show conception until
a successful reduction to practice has occurred, recognizing that the
conception is incomplete until that point. 4 Prior to this ruling it appeared
that in the unpredictable arts, such as chemistry and biology, this doctrine
would apply, while in the predictable arts, such as mechanical inventions,
only conception was required. Here the court explained that the existence
of this doctrine is not due to the unpredictable nature of a given field. 5
Thus, the requirement of conception along with corroborating evidence of
the conception is the only test for inventorship.
he visualized a coating of a polarizer on the non-planar surface." Harris further noted that the interference
was not concerned with the precise polarizing material used, though the court based its determination that
Land was not an inventor on the fact that he had not conceived of the material before Dreyer's filing date).
52 See Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1169, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1601, 1604 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (stating
that an inventor does not complete conception of a biologically active gene sequence until the completion
of successful reduction to practice); Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1206, 18
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1016, 1021 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding that conception does not result when an inventor
merely describes an invention by its primary biological property, but that "when an inventor is unable
to envision the detailed constitution of a gene so as to distinguish it from other materials, as well as a
method for obtaining it, conception has not been achieved until reduction to practice has occurred").
" SeeSmithv. Bousquet, 111 F.2d 157,159,45 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 347, 349 (C.C.P.A. 1940) (stating that
in experimental fields, such as biology and chemistry, conception and reduction to practice are
inseparable).
Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Lab., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1229, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1915, 1920
(Fed. Cir. 1994) (explaining that in such cases the reduction to practice is the only evidence to corroborate
conception of the invention).
11 il at 1229.
[Vol. 7:191
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F. DEFINITION OF CONCEPTION
Conception is traditionally defined according to the "Mergenthaler
standard" enunciated in 1897. In Mergenthaler v. Scudder, conception was
defined as follows:
[t]he conception of the invention consists in the
complete performance of the mental part of the
inventive act. All that remains to be accomplished, in
order to perfect the act or instrument belongs to the
department of construction, not invention. It is
therefore the formation, in the mind of the inventor,
of a definite and permanent idea of the complete and
operative invention, as it is thereafter to be applied in
practice that constitutes an available conception,
within the meaning of the patent law. 6
In Land v. Dreyer, the C.C.P.A. modified this standard to distinguish
conception from reduction to practice. It stated that conception must be
"complete and operative and such as would enable a person skilled in the art
to reduce the conception to practice without any further research or exercise
of the inventive skill."57
Because conception is a mental practice, corroboration is required to
prove that it occurred. However, different burdens of proof exist with
respect to upholding the inventorship entity in an issued patent and
challenging that inventorship entity. An issued patent is presumed to be
correct. Thus, misjoinder and non-joinder must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence. Further, non-joinder is traditionally looked down
upon by the courts as a technical defense asserted by alleged infringers.
Therefore, stronger corroborating evidence is needed to prove that the stated
inventorship entity is incorrect than is required to uphold it.
In cases in which corroboration demonstrated that the alleged inventor
had contributed to the specific details of the invention, courts found that this
individual was a true inventor. However, when the corroboration merely
s Mergenthaler v. Scudder, 11 App. D.C. 264, 276 (App. D.C. 1897).
', Land v. Dreyer, 155 F.2d 383, 387, 69 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 602, 605 (C.C.P.A. 1946).
1999]
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supported the notion that the individual had contributed to the general
concept of the invention, the court found that he was not an inventor
because he had not contributed to the complete and operative invention.
Though a general requirement for conception existed, questions still arose
in making determinations of joint inventorship. The Patent Act was
amended in 1984 to help establish guidelines for such determinations. Part
I of this Note will describe the effect of the 1984 Amendments in
determinations of joint inventorship.
I. 1984 AMENDMENTS
In 1984 Congress attempted to clarify the joint inventorship requirements
and amended the Patent Act to codify prior case law."' Prior to the 1984
Amendments, the 1952 Patent Act had failed to define the circumstances
under which joint inventorship existed, 9 and therefore different courts had
articulated different standards. Two conflicting standards were the "all
claims" rule and the "non-all claims" rule. Failure by the courts to agree
upon a uniform standard for joint inventorship necessitated Congressional
action. Examples of the disagreement among the courts prior to the 1984
Amendments follows.
A. THE "ALL CLAIMS" RULE
The "all claims" rule required each inventor to contribute to every claim
in the patent.' This standard for inventorship reflected the ownership rights
granted to each inventor. Each inventor is a co-tenant with respect to the
patent rights,6' and by requiring each inventor to contribute to every claim,
35 U.S.C. S 116 (1994) (amendment found at Pub. L. No. 98-622 (1984)).
" See 35 U.S.C. S 116 (1982) (reciting the joint inventorship rules prior to the 1984 Amendments).
Prior to the 1984 Amendments, section 116 acknowledged that joint inventorship exists and provided
procedures for jointly applying for a patent and for correcting inventorship.
' See Rival Mfg. Co. v. Dazey Prod. Co., 358 F. Supp. 91, 101, 177 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 432, 439 (W.D.
Mo. 1973) ([Independent mechanical features that are . . . separate claims in a patent, although
incorporated in a single machine, remain separate and distinct inventions."); Stewart v. Tenk, 32 F. 665
(C.C.S.D. IMI. 1887) (holding that because the inventors had not co-invented the claim at issue they were
not joint inventors and a separate patent should have been issued to the sole inventor of that claim); Ex
parteMartin, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 543,544 (P.T.O.B. App. 1981) (reciting that joint inventorship requires
"that every claim of an application be a product of the same inventive entity").
61 35 U.S.C. S 262 (1994); see infra Part VI (discussing Patent Co-tenancy and Economics).
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the "all claims" rule ensured that each inventor deserved a co-equal right in
the patent. However, this standard had a significant drawback. To receive
patent rights to a complete device or process, the "all claims" rule often
required that multiple patent applications be prosecuted when there were
multiple inventors. In In re Sarett, the court noted that "[t]his rule of law
forces the filing of distinct applications [when there are different inventors
for different claims] and creates the complexities and delays which could be
avoided under a less rigid statute."62
B. THE "NON-ALL CLAIMS" RULE
In contrast to the rigidity of the "all claims" rule, some courts enunciated
the more flexible "non-all claims" rule. This standard allowed for joint
inventorship when different inventors had contributed to different claims,
as long as they met the other requirements of inventorship 63 and their
contributions resulted in one invention. In SAB Industri AB v. Bendix Corp.
the court commented on the validity of the "all claims" rule, stating that
"[n]either the statute nor any rule of the Patent Office... cited to the Court
provides such a restrictive meaning of the term 'joint.' " This case involved
a patent infringement action regarding patents covering automatic slack
adjusters for vehicle brakes. 6 The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had
infringed its patent. Two of the defendant's defenses were that (1) there was
no infringement and (2) the patent was invalid for improper inventorship.66
The court found for the defendant, finding the defendant had not infringed
the plaintiff's patent.67
62 In re Sarett, 327 F.2d 1005, 1010 n.7, 140 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 474, 479 n.7 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
6 See supra Part Il (defining inventorship as requiring conception and reduction to practice); see also
infra Part IV (discussing the collaboration requirement for joint inventorship).
' SAB Industri AB v. Bendix Corp., 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 95, 104 (E.D. Va. 1978). The court
distinguished that case from Rival Mfg. Co., 358 F. Supp. 91, 177 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 432, by noting that
RivalMfg. Co. involved a lack of collaboration between the alleged joint inventors because the inventors
"had developed their features of the invention separately, at different times and places without active
communication between them upon the same subject." SAB Industri AB, 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 104
(describing RivalMfg. Co., 358 F. Supp. at 101, 177 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 439-40).
's SABIndustriAB, 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 95.
Id at 100-02.
Id at 107.
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In analyzing the claim of incorrect inventorship, the court assumed that
the defendant's argument for using the "all claims" rule was correct."
However, even with that restrictive rule, the court found that the
inventorship was properly corrected (if it had been incorrectly stated
initially) because there was no deceptive intent when the oaths of
inventorship were made.69
In this case, the patent application had claimed joint inventorship.
Because the examiner determined that more than one invention was claimed
in the application, some of the claims were canceled and then claimed in a
divisional application.7" As a result, a new oath as to inventorship was made.
This oath stated that, for the purposes of the divisional application, only one
inventor had conceived of the subject matter." Because the court found that
both the first and the second oaths as to inventorship were truthfully made
with no intent to deceive the PTO, the inventorship was upheld.
The court in Vekamaf Holland B. V v. Pepe Benders, Inc. 3 found that the
"non-all claims" rule allows joint inventorship for patents "even if all of the
joint inventors did not contribute to each and every one of the claims." 4
The patent at issue concerned a technological improvement to a method for
custom bending industrial pipe and other elongated objects."5 The court
found that the "inventive principle generic to all of the claims allows for
deviation in the bending radius during the bending operation, a detection of
those deviations, and correction thereof by a longitudinal movement of the
heating means."76 Though only one inventor had invented one of the
6' Id at 104.
69 SAB Industri AB v. Bendix Corp., 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 95, 105 (E.D. Va. 1978); see infra note 94
and accompanying text (quoting the statute for correction of inventorship).
' A divisional application results when two or more independent and distinct inventions are claimed
in one application. Then, "the Commissioner may require the application to be restricted to one of the
inventions. If the other invention is made the subject of a divisional application which complies with the
requirements of" 35 U.S.C. S 120 (Supp. 1998), it is entitled to the filing date of the original application.
35 U.S.C. S 121 (Supp. 1998).
71 SAB Industri AB, 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 104 ("Upon thus realizing that there were in fact two
inventions and a decision was made to proceed with the preparation of the divisional application, it was
noted that [the subject matter claimed in the divisional application] was in reality the work of only one
of us..."). Id.
71 Id. at 105.
7' 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 955 (D. Minn. 1981).
71 Vekamaf HoUand B.V. v. Pepe Benders, Inc., 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 955,966 (D. Minn. 1981) (citing
SAB Industri AB v. Bendix Corp., 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 95, 105 (E.D. Va. 1978) for support).
" VekamafHolland B V., 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 960.
76 L at 966.
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methods claimed in the patent, a second inventor had worked with the first
to conceive of a second method, which was also claimed in the patent; the
court held that the inventors were properly joined because both of these
methods were part of the "generic inventive principle" of the invention at
issue.7 Because both patentees made some original contribution to the entire
inventive concept, they were properly joined in one patent."
The court in Monsanto Co. v. Kamp79 defined joint inventorship in
accordance with the "non-all claims" rule as well.8" There the court upheld
the Board of Patent Interference's determination that the defendant had
priority to patent plastic pharmaceutical bottles lined with polyethylene.81
In reaching this decision, the court enunciated the following definition of
joint inventorship:
[a] joint invention is the product of collaboration of
the inventive endeavors of two or more persons
working toward the same end and producing an
invention by their aggregate efforts. . . . Each
[inventor] needs to perform but a part of the task if an
invention emerges from all of the steps taken
together. It is not necessary that the entire inventive
concept should occur to each of the joint inventors,
or that the two should physically work on the project
together .... [It is a joint invention] if each makes
some original contribution, though partial, to the
final solution of the problem. 2
In upholding the joint inventorship claimed in the defendant's patent, the
court noted that each of the named inventors performed experimental work
in a separate laboratory. Further, the court noted that "[t]he two co-workers
were in frequent consultation with each other concerning various aspects of
the project.. .[and t]here was an interchange of ideas between the two, until
77 Id
7S Id.
269 F. Supp. 818, 154 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 259 (D.D.C. 1967).
SO Monsanto Co. v. Kamp, 269 F. Supp. 818, 824, 154 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 259, 262 (D.D.C. 1967).
', Monsanto Co., 269 F. Supp. 818, 154 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 259.
92 Id at 824.
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finally a consummation was reached." 3 Although each inventor had worked
separately in a physical sense, the inventors had collaborated through
consultations with each other to reach the final, complete invention.
These three cases depict the "non-all claims" rule as providing for joint
inventorship when, while working towards the completion of a common,
nonobvious, and novel subject matter, (1) the inventors have not physically
worked together to produce the subject matter of the invention, (2) each
inventor has contributed a different quantity of work effort towards the
common subject matter, or (3) each inventor has not contributed to every
claim. 4
C. ADVANTAGES TO THE "NON-ALL CLAIMS" RULE
The primary advantage to the "non-all claims" rule is that it expedites
patent prosecution for a given device or process. Under this standard, only
one patent must be filed for the disclosure of a complete inventive subject
matter. Additionally, this standard provides a greater likelihood than the "all
claims" rule does that once a patent issues, complete rights to market the
invention reside with the joint inventors or their assignees.
The "non-all claims" rule supports the efforts of team research. In passing
the 1984 Amendments, Rep. Kastenmeier stated that the purpose of the
amendments to section 116 was to "recognize[] the realities of modern team
research.""5 During the Congressional hearings, GeraldJ. Mossinghoff, then
Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, testified as follows:
[s]cientists or researchers in an organization often
work on a particular aspect or embodiment of the
invention, or on only a portion of the invention,
while others work on different aspects, embodiments
or portions. Scientists are continually added to a
research team, while other scientists leave the team.
i dL at 825.
" See infra note 90 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative history of the 1984
Amendments).
" Section-by-Section Analysis ofH.R. 6286, Pat. LawA mendments Act of1984, 130 CONG. REC. 28069,
28071 (1984) [hereinafter Section Analysis].
[Vol. 7:191
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Concepts and development plans generated through
brainstorming cannot always be accurately attributed.
Adequate protection for an invention may require
the filing of several applications to cover the separate
contributions to all of its aspects [under an "all
claims" rule]. 86
Thus, the "non-all claims" rule supports team research endeavors because it
allows for joinder of individuals who contributed to an invention, regardless
of whether they contributed to every claim. Further, it simplifies the work
of the patent council because only one application needs to be filed and
prosecuted for each invention and documentation regarding which inventor
contributed to which claim is unnecessary.
D. 1984 AMENDMENTS: CODIFICATION OF THE "NON-ALL CLAIMS" RULE
The 1984 Amendments resolved the joint inventorship debate by
codifying the "non-all claims" rule. Section 116 of the Patent Act, as
amended, states:
[w]hen an invention is made by two or more persons
jointly, they shall apply for patent jointly and each
make the required oath, except as otherwise provided
in this title. Inventors may apply for a patent jointly
even though (1) they did not physically work together
or at the same time, (2) each did not make the same
type or amount of contribution, or (3) each did not
make a contribution to the subject matter of every
claim of the patent.8"
86 Hearings on H.R. 3285, H.R. 3286, and H.R. 3605 Before Suhcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and
the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the judiciary, 98th Cong. 61-28 (1984) (written
statement of Mossinghoff).
'z 35 U.S.C. S 116 (1994). Items (1) and (2) codify the rationale of Monsanto Co. v. Kamp, 269 F.
Supp. 818, 154 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 259 (D.D.C. 1967), while item (3) codifies that of SAB Industri AB v.
Bendix Corp., 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 95 (E.D. Va. 1978).
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The legislative history for this section clarifies some aspects of the
amendment, but it leaves other aspects open to be defined by the courts or
by future legislation. Representative Kastenmeier summarized this section,
stating that it "provides that two or more inventors may obtain a patent
jointly even though each inventor has not contributed to each and every
claim found in the patent application."88 Further, the legislative history
makes clear that items (1) and (2) follow the rationale of Monsanto Co., while
item (3) follows the rationale of cases such as SAB Industri AB. 9 However,
the amendments do not state the precise criteria for a determination of joint
inventorship; ° thus, confusion in determinations of joint inventorship by
inventors and employers often results.
E. JOINT INVENTORSHIP IS NOT CLEARLY DEFINED
Prior to the 1984 Amendments, courts had difficulty in defining joint
inventorship. One court explained that "[t]he exact parameters of what
constitutes joint inventorship are quite difficult to define. It is one of the
muddiest concepts in the muddy metaphysics of the patent law."'" Though
section 116 explicitly requires joint inventors to apply for a patent together,
it never defines the term "joint inventors." The list of situations which may
result in joint inventorship is not comprehensive. By merely stating that
joint inventorship is not precluded in the listed situations, and by not
defining facts which contribute to a determination of joint inventorship,
courts are forced to examine the facts of each case to determine whether the
conception requirement has been met by the inventorship entity. Further,
whether collaboration is still required for a determination of joint
88 Section Analysis, supra note 85, at 28073.
9 ld2 at 28071.
'o See Hearing on S. 1535 and S. 1841 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Gong. 31-67, 69 (1984) (quoting Bernerarr Pravel, President of
AIPLA, as stating that "[t]he amendments to Section 116 of Title 35 should have a twofold purpose: (1)
to permit inventors to be joined in a single patent application, even though they may not have contributed
to every claim in the application, and (2) to clarify the criteria for joint inventorship") [hereinafter Senate
Hearings].
91 Mueller Brass Co. v. Reading Indus. Inc., 352 F. Supp. 1357, 1372, 176 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 361, 372
(E.D. Pa. 1972). The difficulty in defining joint inventorship is due in part to the nebulous definition of
conception, which is a crucial element in the definition of inventor. Further, it is often difficult to
determine what the "complete and operative invention" is. Thus, determinations of inventorship, in
general, can be "muddy."
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inventorship is not discussed in the 1984 Amendments. The requirement
that joint inventors collaborate in forming the final, complete inventive
concept is discussed in Part IV.
IV. COLLABORATION REQUIREMENT FOR JOINT INVENTORSHIP
Joint inventorship has traditionally required collaboration between joint
inventors. A quick reading of section 116 could result in the belief that
collaboration is no longer required. However, a more careful analysis of the
wording of the amendment, its legislative history, and the cases since the
1984 Amendment indicate that the collaboration requirement remains.
A. TRADITIONAL REQUIREMENT
Pre-1984 Amendment cases recited the collaboration requirement as
follows: "[j]oint invention connotes collaboration of effort to produce a
complete and operative invention."92 Monsanto Co. elaborated on the
collaboration requirement by stating specific circumstances in which joint
inventorship is not precluded.93 There, the court explained that the
inventors must work together, though they need not be physically together,
to produce the invention.
The structure of secton 116 demonstrates Congressional intent to retain
the collaboration requirement: section 116, as amended, contains the same
first sentence as had been used prior to the 1984 Amendments.94 Prior to
1984, it was well-established in case law that collaboration between joint
inventors was required. Because the amendments to the statute do not
explicitly change this requirement, it appears that Congress intended to
retain the collaboration requirement.
92 Garrett Corp. v. United States, 422 F.2d 874, 881, 164 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 521, 526 (Ct. C1. 1970).
9' See supra note 82 and accompanying text (quoting Monsanto Co.'s "non-all claims" rule).
" 35 U.S.C. § 116 (1994). This section begins by stating "[when an invention is made by two or more
persons jointly, they shall applyfor patent jointly and each make the required oath, except as otherwise provided
in this title"; cf 35 U.S.C. S 116 (1982) (beginning with a similar statement, "[wihen an invention is made
by two or more persons jointly, they shall applyfor patent jointly and each sign the application and make the
required oath, except as otherwiseprovided in this title") (emphasis added to show the similarity between the
wording used in pre-1984 and post-1984 S 116).
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Section 116 specifically recites three situations in which joint inventorship
is not precluded.9" By stating that joint inventorship may exist even when
the inventors "did not physically work together or at the same time,"
Congress implied that the traditional rule requiring collaboration remained.
If Congress had intended to remove the collaboration requirement, it would
not have discussed the particular situation in which inventors do not
physically work together. Such a circumstance would have been implied
based on the general understanding that collaboration was unnecessary.
Thus, because Congress explicitly stated that such a circumstance does not
preclude a determination of joint inventorship, Congress has more clearly
defined the collaboration requirement."
An analysis of the legislative history further demonstrates Congressional
intent to retain the requirement of collaboration. The legislative history
states that Congress was codifying the rationales of decisions like Monsanto
Co. and SAB Industri AB.97 These decisions required collaboration for jointinventorship; in fact, Monsanto Co. defined joint inventorship as including
collaboration.98 Further, the legislative history recites that a significant
purpose of the 1984 Amendments was to recognize the realities of modern
team research, i.e., where different people collaborate to produce the
invention. 99
The requirement of collaboration for a determination of joint
inventorship has been enforced by other courts as well. The Federal Circuit,
in a determination that there was no joint inventorship when the inventors
are "totally independent of each other[,]"1° analyzed the statutory
construction of section 116 and found that it required collaboration:
"s See supra note 87 and accompanying text (reciting the entire first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. S 116
(1984)).
9 See Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Distrib. Co., 973 F.2d 911, 916, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1921, 1925 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (examining whether the traditional collaboration requirement still
exists in light of the 1984 Amendments).
'7 Section Analysis, supra note 85, at 28071.
See supra note 82 and accompanying text (quoting definition of joint inventorship found in
Monsanto Co. v. Kamp, 269 F. Supp. 818, 154 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 259 (D.D.C. 1967)).
" Section Analysis, supra note 85, at 28071. With respect to another section of the bill, Rep.
Kastenmeier emphasized the importance of team research by stating that "[this amendment] changes a
complex body of case law which discourages communication among members of research teams working
in corporations, universities or other organizations ... The bill. .. will encourage communication among
members of research teams, and patenting, and consequently public dissemination, of the results of 'team
research.' Id.
"o Kimberly-Clark Corp., 973 F.2d at 917, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1926.
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[w]hat is clear is that the statutory word "jointly" is
not mere surplusage. For persons to be joint
inventors under Section 116, there must be some
element of joint behavior, such as collaboration or
working under common direction, one inventor
seeing a relevant report and building upon it or
hearing another's suggestion at a meeting.
101
In 1993, the District Court for the Southern District of California stated
that "[j]oint invention connotes collaboration of effort to produce a
complete and operative invention."102 The court cited a pre-1984
Amendment Court of Claims case as the authority for this view. By
analyzing the structure of the statute and expressly adopting past cases as
authority, the courts demonstrate that collaboration is still a requirement for
joint inventorship.
Though Congress has clarified the standards for joint inventorship,
mistakes are often made in determining the true inventors; legislators have
recognized this problem and have amended the Patent Act to allow for
correction of inventorship in most situations. The correction of
inventorship errors in patent applications and issued patents will be
examined in Part V.
V. CORRECTION OF INVENTORSHIP ERRORS
In 1982 and 1984 the Patent Act was amended to facilitate a patent
entity's ability to correct inventorship. 13 Prior to the 1952 Patent Act, a
patentee had a limited opportunity to correct inventorship without losing his
patent rights."°  This problem had been addressed in subsequent
amendments, yet limitations still existed. For instance, a complete mistake
with respect to ownership (i.e., where no proper inventor is named in the
101 Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Distrib. Co., 973 F.2d 911,917,23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1921, 1926 (Fed. Cit. 1992).
102 University of Cal. v. Synbiotics Corp., 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1463, 1466 (S.D. Cal. 1993) (citing
Garrett Corp. v. United States, 422 F.2d 874, 881, 164 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 521, 526 (Ct. Cl. 1970)).
103 See 35 U.S.C. S 116 (1994) (regarding correction of inventorship in a patent application); 35 U.S.C.
S 256 (1994) (regarding correction of inventorship in an issued patent).
104 See DONALD S. CHISUM, 1 CHISUM ON PATENTS S 2.04 (1985) (discussing correction of
inventorship errors).
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patent or patent application) could not be corrected prior to the 1982 and
1984 amendments 05
Sections 116 and 256 contain provisions for the correction of
inventorship mistakes. A pertinent portion of section 116 states:
[w]henever through error a person is named in an
application for patent as the inventor, or through
error an inventor is not named in an application, and
such error arose without any deceptive intention on
his part, the Commissioner may permit the
application to be amended accordingly, under such
terms as he prescribes."
Section 256, a companion provision to section 116, states as follows:
[w]henever through error a person is named in an
issued patent as the inventor, or through error an
inventor is not named in an issued patent and such
error arose without any deceptive intention on his
part, the Commissioner may. . .issue a certificate
correcting such error.
The error of omitting inventors or naming persons
who are not inventors shall not invalidate the patent
in which such error occurred if it can be corrected as
provided in this section. The court before which such
matter is called in question may order correction of
the patent on notice and hearing of all parties
concerned and the Commissioner shall issue a
certificate accordingly.""7
Io l ; see also Garrett Corp., 422 F.2d at.881 n.5, 164 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 530 n.5 (noting that if one
party had been the sole inventor of a claim, correction of inventorship could not occur, "because no
proper inventor was named ab initio").
106 35 U.S.C. 5 116 (1994).
107 35 U.S.C. S 256 (1994).
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These sections are nearly identical to each other. Both sections allow for
correction in cases of misjoinder (i.e., when a person was named as an
inventor and is not one), non-joinder (i.e., when a person is not named as an
inventor and is one), and complete mistakes with respect to inventorship.
Further, both sections require a lack of deceptive intent when the error in
inventorship is made. However, these sections differ with respect to the
presence of a comma after the mention of non-joinder and before the
requirement of lack of deceptive intent. 08 Because of this difference, the
Federal Circuit held in Stark v. Advanced Magnetic, Inc. that there are
different standards for misjoinder and nonjoinder in patent applications than
for issued patents.0 9
Why the Federal Circuit established this distinction and whether this
view is an accurate depiction of Congressional intent is examined below.
A. REQUIREMENT OF LACK OF DECEPTIVE INTENT
Both section 116 and section 256 contain two clauses, one dealing with
misjoinder and the other with non-joinder."0 In section 116, these clauses
are separated by commas, as is the requirement for lack of deceptive intent."'
By contrast, in section 256, the second clause regarding non-joinder is not
separated by a comma from the lack of deceptive intent requirement.1
2
Though Congress has suggested in the legislative history that sections 256
and 116 should be interpreted in the same manner, 113 the Federal Circuit has
noted that they can be distinguished.
Each of these sections begins with the term "error." The Federal Circuit
construed this term to refer to "mistakes, whether deceptive and 'dishonest'
'08 Section 116 states as follows: ... through error a person is named..., or through error an inventor
is not named.... and such error arose without deceptive intention..." 35 U.S.C. S 116 (1994).
Section 256 states as follows: "... through error a person is named.... or through error an inventor
is not named.. .and such error arose without any deceptive intention..." 35 U.S.C. S 256 (1994).
9 119 F.3d 1551, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
"' See id at 1553 (analyzing section 256).
. See supra note 108 (focusing on section 116's presence of a comma).
112 See supra note 108 (focusing on section 256's absence of a comma).
113 See S. REP. No. 82-1979, at 150 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2401 (stating that
"[s]ection 256 is a new section in the law that is correlated with section 116"); H.R. REP. NO. 97-542, at
10 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 765, 774 (stating that "[slection 256... is a companion to
section 116").
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or merely uninformed and 'honest."" 4 Due to the placement of a comma,
the Federal Circuit has interpreted section 116 to allow for correction of
inventorship, both in cases of misjoinder and of non-joinder, when the error
was made with a lack of deceptive intent. In contrast, the Federal Circuit has
determined that section 256 "allows correction in all misjoinder cases
featuring an error and in those non-joinder cases where the unnamed
inventor is free of deceptive intent. " 15
However, the Federal Circuit's distinction between section 116 and
section 256 in Stark appears to be misguided, particularly in light of the
legislative history and the rules promulgated by the Department of
Commerce through the Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) regarding
correction of inventorship in pending patent applications and in issued
patents.
As previously discussed, the legislative history states that section 256 of
title 35 is a companion to section 116.16 Section 256 was added in an effort
to simplify correction of inventorship so that patents would not be
invalidated when a mistake regarding inventorship was discovered. Thus,
these sections should be interpreted as having the same standards regarding
non-joinder and misjoinder. No public policy is furthered by distinguishing
issued patents from patent applications with regard to correction of
inventorship requirements.
In a patent application, the inventors sign an oath stating that they are the
true inventors and that the information stated is made without deceptive
intent. If the patent issues, this oath remains the sole "proof" that the named
inventors are the true inventors. Because inventorship statements are merely
procedural matters, correcting inventorship during prosecution or after
issuance should be allowed under the same circumstances.
The PTO allows for correction of inventorship in patent applications in
accordance with section 1.48 of title 37 of the C.F.R. 117 and for correction of
inventorship in issued patents in accordance with section 1.324.1 Under
section 1.48, correcting inventorship merely requires (1) a petition from each
person being added or deleted as an inventor stating that the error in
114 Stark v. Advanced Magnetic, Inc., 119 F.3d 1551, 1555,43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321,1324 (Fed. Cir.
1997).
115 Id
116 H.R. REP. No. 97-542, at 10 (1982) reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 765, 774.
11 37 C.F.R. S 1.48(a) (1998).
... 37 C.F.R. S 1.48 (1998).
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inventorship occurred without deceptive intent on his or her part, (2) an
oath or declaration by the actual inventor(s), (3) the required fee, and (4) the
written consent of any assignees, if an assignment has been made." 9
The PTO, in promulgating this amendment to 37 C.F.R. S 1.48, removed
the requirements for a statement of facts and diligence and explained the
change as follows:
A statement that the error was made without
deceptive intent is seen to be a sufficient investigation
complying with the statutory requirement under 35
U.S.C. S 116, particularly as most petitions are
eventually granted or an application can be refiled
naming the new desired inventive entity.
Additionally it should be noted that the [PTO] views
a petition under S1.48 to be a procedural matter and
not to represent a substantive determination as to the
actual inventorship.
[F]urther inquiries into the matter other than a
statement of lack of deceptive intent are a waste of
[PTO] resources. 2 '
Thus, the PTO has continued to simplify an inventor's ability to correct
inventorship in a pending application so that the patent prosecution process
may continue.
Similarly, under section 1.324, a named patentee or unnamed inventor
can file a petition with the PTO to issue a certificate naming the correct
inventors."1 Such a petition has similar requirements to those under section
1.48. Thus the PTO recognizes section 116 and section 256 as requiring lack
of deceptive intent in cases of non-joinder and misjoinder.
Because sections 256 and 116 are intended to fulfill the same policy goals,
the same standards for correction of inventorship should be applied for
issued patents as are applied to pending applications. Pending applications
119 37 C.F.R. S 1.324 (1998).
120 62 Fed. Reg. 53,132, 53,138 (1997).
'at 37 C.F.R. S 1.324 (1998).
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and issued patents should require that a lack of deceptive intent exists in both
cases of non-joinder and misjoinder for correction of inventorship to occur.
Sections 116 and 256 provide a definition of joint inventorship and a
relatively simple method for correcting inventorship. Thus, they appear to
fulfill the goal of meeting the needs of team research. However, the 1984
Amendments do not relate to the issue of ownership of patent rights. As a
result, were a court to construe the description of joint inventorship in
sections 116 and 256 using the traditional view of joint inventors as co-
tenants, the goal of meeting the needs of team research could potentially be
defeated.
The next part will analyze a joint inventor's rights and the potentially
disastrous results that can arise when an error in determining inventorship
has occurred.
VI. PATENT CO-TENANCY AND ECONOMICS
The patent co-tenancy is different from traditional, common-law co-
tenancy.' Section 262 of the Patent Act addresses this as follows:
[i]n the absence of any agreement to the contrary,
each of the joint owners of a patent may make, use,
offer to sell, or sell the patented invention within the
United States, or import the patented invention into
the United States, without the consent of and without
accounting to the other owners.'23
Thus, in Ethicon, Inc., the unnamed inventor was able to grant a license to
U.S. Surgical though the named inventor opposed such an act. 124
While each co-owner may "use the patent or license others to so use
without liability to other owners, . . . a suit for infringement must be
12 Cf JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 236 (4th ed. 1998). Copyright law follows common-law co-
tenancy notions. Joint authors of a copyrighted work have an independent right to use or to license the
use of a work, subject to a duty to account to the other co-owners for any profits. Id.
" 35 U.S.C. S 262 (1994).
114 Ethicon, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 45 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1545 (Fed. Cir.
1998), cert. denied 119 S. Ct. 278 (1998). See infra notes 131-62 and accompanying text discussing Ethicon,
Inc..
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brought by all co-owners." 25 Thus joint inventors are "at the mercy of each
other."'26 A joint inventor can license the patent without the permission of
the other joint inventor(s) as many times as he or she desires, and thereby
reduce the value of the invention. Further, if a joint inventor wishes to enter
into litigation against a potential infringer, he cannot do so unless the other
co-inventors voluntarily join in the suit.' Lastly, because section 102(f)
requires that the invention be granted to the inventor, employers typically
require their employees to assign the rights in the invention to the employer.
However, contracts requiring an assignment of rights if a patent application
is filed do not necessarily result in an assignment of the patent rights when
an application is filed. 2' Therefore, at the time the patent application is
filed, employers must identify the inventors and the inventors must assign
their rights to the employer. If such assignments are not made, inventors
have the right to license or to assign the rights to whomever they choose.
Thus, if one inventor was not identified and did not make such an
assignment, a competitor could receive a license to practice the invention
that had been assigned to the employer by the named inventors. These
problems can be illustrated by an examination of Ethicon, Inc. v. United
States Surgical Corp.'29
A. DISCUSSION OF ETHICON, INC. V. UNITED STA TES SURGICAL CORP.
2 Turchan v. Bailey Meter Co., 19 F.R.D. 201, 204, 109 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 473, 475 (D. Del. 1956)
(emphasis added) (citing 2 ERNEST BAINBRIDGE LIPSCOMB I, WALKER ON PATENTS 1450 (1987)); cf. 17
U.S.C. S 501(b),(c) (1994) (stating that co-tenants in copyright law are not required to join, by statute,
though a court may compel their joinder).
126 Turchan, 19 F.R.D. at 204, 109 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 475 (citing McDuffee v. Hestonville, M. & F.
Pass. Ry. Co., 162 F. 36, 39 (3d Cir. 1908)).
12 Bendix Aviation Corp. v. Kury, 88 F. Supp. 243,247-48,84 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 189,192-93 (E.D.N.Y.
1950) (requiring joinder of a joint owner in a patent because he was an indispensable party to the action);
Turchan, 19 F.R.D. at 204, 109 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 475 (stating that the reason for requiring joinder is to
preserve each co-inventor's right to grant a license); see FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a),(b) (concerning joinder of
necessary and indispensable parties).
12 See Filmtec Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 939 F.2d 1568,1572,19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1508, 1510 (Fed.
Cir. 1991) (stating that an inventor's employment contract which obligates him to transfer all patent rights
to inventions made while an employee does not act as an assignment, i.e., the employer does not have the
right to sue for patent infringement. However, the employer's interest in the patent may "be in the
nature of an equitable claim").
129 135 F.3d 1456, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1595 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied 119 S. Ct. 278 (1998).
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In Ethicon Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp., one of the joint inventors,
Choi, refused to join suit against a potential past and future infringer and
granted a "retroactive license" to the potential infringer. 3 ' The Federal
Circuit held that Choi, although he was not named on the patent
application, was a joint inventor and was an indispensable party to any
infringement action.' Because the co-inventor, Choi, refused to join in the
infringement suit, the plaintiff was unable to pursue the action. In effect, the
non-joined co-inventor unilaterally invalidated the patent.
The patent at issue in Ethicon, Inc., U.S. Patent No. 4,535,773, was
directed to a safety trocar.132 It issued to Dr. InBae Yoon as the sole
inventor."'
In 1980, Dr. Yoon met Mr. Young Jae Choi, an electronics technician
with some college training in physics, chemistry and electrical engineering.'34
Until 1982, they worked together on Dr. Yoon's projects, including the
safety trocar project.13 In 1982, after Choi left, Yoon filed an application for
a patent relating to various embodiments for a safety trocar, naming himself
as the sole inventor.'36 In 1985, the patent issued with fifty-five claims.
Yoon subsequently granted an exclusive license to Ethicon.3 7 Yoon never
informed Choi of the application nor of its issuance. 38
In 1989 Ethicon filed suit against U.S. Surgical for infringement of claims
34 and 50 of the patent. 3 9 While the suit was pending, U.S. Surgical learned
of Choi's role in the invention and obtained a "retroactive license" to
130 Id. at 1458.
131 Id at 1468 (stating that because "Ethicon's complaint lacks the participation of a co-owner of the
patent[,].. .[the] court must order a dismissal of [the] suit").
13. Id. at 1459. A conventional trocar is a surgical instrument which makes small incisions in the wall
of a body cavity to allow for the placement of endoscopic instruments, such as small cameras or surgical
instruments. Conventional trocars posed a risk of damage to internal organs. The safety trocar alleviated
these risks by utilizing a blunt spring-loaded rod. As soon as the trocar pierces the cavity wall, the rod
springs forward to precede the blade and to protect internal organs from injury. In a second embodiment,
the safety trocar has a retractable trocar blade which springs back into a protective sheath once the blade
passes through the cavity wall. Id
133 Id. at 1459.
134 "Ethicon, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1458, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545,
1547 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied 119 S. Ct. 278 (1998).
. Id at 1459.
136 Id
137 Id
138 d
139 Ethicon, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1459, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545,
1547 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied 119 S. Ct. 278 (1998).
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practice his trocar inventions and to receive his assistance in any suit
regarding the patent."
The District Court for the District of Connecticut found that Choi was
a joint inventor of the patented subject matter because he had contributed
to claims 33 and 47, claims which U.S. Surgical was not -alleged to have
infringed. On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the District Court's
finding of joint inventorship. 4' It further held that although the retroactive
license was not an effective grant of rights to practice the invention, the case
must be dismissed because of Choi's refusal to join as a plaintiff in the suit.'
In reaching this result, the Federal Circuit stated that "as a matter of
substantive patent law, all co-owners must ordinarily consent to join as
plaintiffs in an infringement suit."'43 Though the majority readily accepted
that the voluntary joinder of all co-owners was required under the Patent
Act, Judge Newman disagreed. She devoted the majority of her dissent to
establishing that inventors who had contributed less to the conception of the
invention owned a smaller portion of the rights to the invention than an
inventor who had contributed more to the invention. Her position will be
discussed below.
B. DISCUSSION OF THE DISSENT IN ETHICON, INC.
Judge Newman stated that prior to the 1984 Amendments, joint inventors
received equal ownership rights in the entire patent because all of the circuits
followed the "all claims" rule. 1" While this view inaccurately represented the
confusion which existed prior to the 1984 Amendments regarding the correct
rule for joint inventorship, 145 the fact that the "all claims" rule was a valid
' Id. at 1458.
141 Id at 1465. Cf supra Part ll.D (discussing Land v. Dreyer, 155 F.2d 383, 69 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 602
(C.C.P.A. 1946)).
142 Ethicon, Inc., 135 F.3d at 1467,45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1554. The court held that the retroactive
license by Choi could "not release U.S. Surgical from its liability for past accrued damages to Ethicon,
only from liability to himself." Id
143 Id at 1468.
144 Ethicon, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1470, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545,
1556 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied 119 S. Ct. 278 (1998) (stating that before the 1984 amendments," 'joint
invention' required mutuality of interaction, a real partnership in the creation and development of the
invention," and thus" 'a joint inventor' was, also, justly and legally, an equal owner of the idea and of any
patent thereon"). See supra Part III.A (discussing the "all claims" rule).
145 See supra Parts HII.A and B (discussing the "all claims" rule and the "non-all claims" rule).
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basis for determining joint inventorship prior to 1984 justifies a presumption
of equal contribution in the invention. 46
1. Discussion of the Partnership Theory. The justification for the pre-1984
property rule that joint inventors have equal and undivided interests in the
patent can be explained in terms of a partnership theory.4 ' It has been noted
that "[i]f joint inventors were members of a 'partnership,' whereby they
expended equal amounts of inventive effort and shared in the success or
failure of their project, then a rule providing equal interests in any resulting
patent seemed entirely equitable."'48 Because there was a doubt as to the
requirements for joint inventorship, one could have postulated that a
partnership between co-inventors existed prior to the 1984 Amendments.
However, with the enactment of the 1984 Amendments, which expressly
rejected the "all claims" rule, the partnership theory can no longer be used
as a justification for the grant of equal and undivided interests for co-
inventors.'49 Though there is no longer a theoretical basis for patent co-
tenancy, because the 1984 Amendments did not alter patent ownership
rights, this rule remains.5 0
2. Division of Patent Rights. Due to the potential for inequitable results
under the traditional view, Judge Newman proposed that the property rights
be divided amongst the joint inventors. She stated that common law
property rights and the statutes which implemented them did not recognize
granting a complete property right to one who was a minor contributor to
the creation of the property interest.'5' According to Judge Newman, since
Choi had only contributed to two of the claims, he was a contributor to a
" See Dale L. Carlson &James R. Barney, Who Owns What's in YourPatent?, INTELL. PROP. TODAY,
June 1998, at 8 (stating that "even if the 'all claims' rule was never universally accepted as law, there seems
to be some historical merit to Judge Newman's premise," since it provided a "logical basis and
foundational support for the ... inventors").
" See id (notingJudge Newman's "partnership theory" as the basis for undivided and equal property
rights in inventions for co-inventors).
148 Id.
'49 See idL (stating that since the enactment of the 1984 Amendment, the "all claims" rule "was
effectively overruled by statute, and thus, the 'partnership' theory of joint inventorship was completely
eviscerated"); Ethicon, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1471, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1545, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied 119 S. Ct. 278 (1998) (stating that after the 1984 Amendments to
section 116, "the legal premise that each named person had made a full and equal contribution to the entire
patented invention became obsolete").
's Ethicon, Inc., 135 F.3d at 1471, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1557.
151 See icL (stating that the common law did not "treat all persons, however minor their contribution,
as full owners of the entire property as a matter of law").
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minor portion of the invention. Thus, he was not a joint owner and could
not grant a license to U.S. Surgical to practice all fifty-five claims."'
While Judge Newman did not recognize minor contributors as joint
owners, she recognized that such individuals are inventors who should
receive some ownership rights. In discussing Dr. Yoon's attempt to divide
the patent through reissue,153 Judge Newman noted that "[t]here may be a
need for determination of the respective rights of Dr. Yoon and Mr.
Choi." "4 Based on her further discussion of the traditional co-tenant's right
to partition, it appears that she advocates dividing the ownership interests
based on the inventorship of each individual claim."15
3. Problems with Judge Newman's Suggestion. Judge Newman's suggestion
of partitioning the patent rights among joint inventors has been criticized as
requiring major changes in the way patents are documented and enforced.5 6
Though such a rule would still accomplish the goal of promoting team
research, the hassle of the "all claims" rule would remain. Under Judge
Newman's proposed rule, documentation for each contribution made by
each inventor could be required to determine which inventor contributed to
which claim(s).
Presently the PTO does not investigate inventorship claims. In the past
a petition to correct inventorship under 37 C.F.R. S 1.48 required a statement
of facts explaining why a correction of inventorship was necessary and how
the error arose; however, under a 1997 amendment, it no longer requires
such a statement.1 7  Correction of inventorship is merely a procedural
matter and does not represent a substantive determination as to actual
inventorship.'58 Thus, the PTO appears to be simplifying the procedure
required for correcting inventorship in patent applications to expedite the
..2 I at 1472.
... Reissue arises when the applicant believes the original patent to be wholly or partly inoperative
(1) by reason of a defective specification or drawing, or (2) by reason of the patentee claiming more or less
than he had the right to claim in the patent. A reissue declaration or oath requires a statement as to why
the applicant is requesting a reissue, a statement of at least one error being relied upon as the basis for the
reissue, and a declaration that the errors being corrected were made without deceptive intent on the part
of the applicant. 37 C.F.R. S1.175(a) (1998).
" Ethicon, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456,1472 n.10, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545,
1558 n.10 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied 119 S. Ct. 278 (1998).
... Md (stating that "dividing the patent would comport with common law practices") (citing REAL
PROPERTY 1 607[1]; Hamilton v. Hamilton, 597 A.2d 856, 859-60 (Del. Fain. Ct. 1990)).
s Carlson & Barney, supra note 146.
37 C.F.R. S 1.48(a) (1998).
... See supra note 120 and accompanying text (discussing the changes in 37 C.F.R. S 1.48 (1998)).
1999]
31
Monheit: The Importance of Correct Inventorship
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 1999
J. INTELL. PROP. L.
prosecution of patents and to prevent technical arguments regarding
inventorship from invalidating a patent.
Further, because joint inventorship is a voluntary relationship, any
inequalities which result from the co-tenancy arrangement described by
section 262 can either be accepted by the inventors or dealt with through a
contract between the parties." 9 However, in light of the decision in Ethicon,
Inc., patent attorneys must carefully advise clients with respect to difficulties
which can arise due to joint inventorship.
Though the potential problems under the present rule can be avoided
through contract, such a solution requires an initial determination of
inventorship. Because a determination of inventorship is often difficult,"6
other solutions to inventorship problems will be examined next.
VII. Two SUGGESTIONS FOR AVOIDING THE
PROBLEM IN ETHICON, INC.
Ethicon, Inc. could have been avoided if Yoon had realized that Choi was
a co-inventor or if Ethicon had been able to sue for infringement without the
voluntary joinder of all co-inventors. Each of these solutions is examined
below.
A. GUIDELINES FOR DETERMINING INVENTORSHIP
The problem in Etbicon, Inc. could have been avoided by a clearer
definition of inventorship. Significant factors for inventorship
determinations can be designed by the PTO and incorporated into the
C.F.R. or the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (M.P.E.P.) or passed
as Congressional legislation. If such guidelines are present, employers and/or
"' Two exceptions to the general rule that all co-owners must consent to join as plaintiffs in an
infringement suit exist: (1) if, by agreement, a co-owner waives his right to refuse to join suit, other co-
owners may subsequently force him to join in a suit against infringers, and (2) when a patent owner has
granted an exclusive license, he stands in a relationship of trust to his licensee and must permit the licensee
to sue in his name. See Ethicon, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1468 n.9, 45
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545, 1554 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied 119 S. Ct. 278 (1998) (citing Willingbam
v. Lawton, 555 F.2d 1340, 1344-45, 194 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 249, 252 (6th Cir. 1977) for the first exception
and Independent Wireless TeL Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 269 U.S. 459, 469 (1926) for the second
exception).
" See supra Part IlI (discussing determinations of inventorship based on conception).
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inventors can more easily determine whether or not a given individual is an
inventor and make the appropriate contractual arrangements.
To qualify as conception in a determination of inventorship, the idea
must be "complete and operative and such as would enable a person skilled
in the art to reduce the conception to practice without any further research
or exercise of the inventive skill."'6' Factors that should be addressed in
determining whether an individual contributed to conception include: (1)
what are the novel and nonobvious aspects of the claimed invention, (2)
what role did each individual play in creating the claimed invention, and (3)
which individuals made contributions that resulted in nonobvious changes
in the development of the claimed invention. The first factor can be
determined by reading the specification of the patents. Particular focus
should be given to the discussion of the objects of the invention and the
problems with the state of the art. In determining the second factor, one
should examine whether a potential inventor merely acted under another's
direction or whether he contributed to specific elements which make the
claimed invention novel and nonobvious. In examining the third factor, one
should determine whether the person of interest added knowledge beyond
that of a knowledgeable salesperson.'62 In making such a determination, one
must distinguish the state of the art from the specific, unique details which
are covered in the claims of the patent or application at issue. Thus, the
determination of inventorship should not be made until the claims are
written.
If the question of joint inventorship is confronted early on, precautions
can be taken to support an inventorship claim. Because clear and convincing
evidence is needed to support a claim of non-joinder or misjoinder, an alleged
joint inventor's testimony is insufficient evidence of the required
collaboration; rather, corroborating evidence is needed to support such an
allegation. Sufficient corroboration can be found in evidence of discussions
or interactions between the joint inventors (e.g., tapes, written records, etc.).
Thus, if an inventor fears that he may be excluded from a patent application,
161 Land v. Dreyer, 155 F.2d 383, 387, 69 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 602, 605 (C.C.P.A. 1946); see supra notes
56-57 and accompanying text (discussing that this is an elaboration of the "Mergenthaler standard").
1 See Hess v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 106 F.3d 976, 981,41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1782,1787
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that one who simply provides the inventor with well-known principles or
explains the state of the art without ever having a firm definite idea of the claimed invention as a whole
does not qualify as a joint inventor).
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he should create a paper trail while working with others to demonstrate that
ideas were shared and discussed between the joint inventors.
Though inventorship is easily corrected under 35 U.S.C. S 256, the
situation of Ethicon, Inc. could easily repeat itself (i.e., the patent could be
practically invalid against a given infringer because that infringer had
obtained a license from a previously unnamed inventor). In light of this
potential disaster, if one is uncertain whether an individual is an inventor,
one should name him as an inventor and have the proper assignments made.
If the patent is litigated and the individual is found to be improperly joined,
the mistake can easily be corrected without loss of patent rights. 163
In the absence of action by the PTO or by Congress, patent counsel can
use such guidelines at the time of filing to determine the roles each member
of the research team played and to record whether an individual made an
inventive contribution to a claim. Such analysis should continue as claims
are amended and canceled.
B. INVOLUNTARY JOINDER
A second solution addresses the requirement of voluntary joinder in a
patent infringement suit. Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(FRCP) relates to the joinder of necessary and indispensable parties. Factors
for determining whether a given party is "indispensable" include the
following:
(1) the extent to which a judgment rendered in the
party's absence might be prejudicial to the party or
those who have already been made parties; (2) the
extent to which this prejudice can be lessened or
avoided by other measures; (3) whether a judgment
rendered in the party's absence is adequate; and (4)
whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if
the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.1"
For the first factor, the court examines whether legal or practical damage
will result if it proceeds without this party. The present parties may be
163 See supra Part V (discussing the ease with which inventorship can be corrected).
164 FED. R. Civ. P. 19(b).
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subjected to multiple suits if the co-owner is not a party to the action. While
multiplicity of suits is a valid reason for requiring joinder, this is not a good
reason for requiring voluntary joinder. Under FRCP 19(a), the court may
join a person as an involuntary plaintiff or defendant.16 Additionally, each
co-owner has an interest in protecting his or her rights in the patent. Thus,
he or she should desire to be a party to the action.'66
Under the second factor, avoidance of adverse consequences, a court
examines whether alternate means are available to the court to minimize
potential damages. Again, here, the co-owner can be joined as an
involuntary plaintiff, thus adverse consequences can be avoided.Under the third factor, the court examines whether the judgment is
adequate from the perspective of the public's interest in the efficient and final
resolution of legal disputes. If a judgment in a party's absence leaves related
claims by or against that person undecided, this may be an inadequate
judgment. Such a determination could be avoided if the co-owner was joined
as an involuntary plaintiff.
In the fourth factor, the court examines whether another forum is
available to the plaintiff. This factor is particularly important when the
other party cannot be joined. In patent suits, the plaintiff could be joined.
Further, if the court required voluntary joinder, there would be no forum
in which the plaintiff could sue the alleged infringer. This factor, like the
other three, weighs in favor of a court's joining the co-owner as an
involuntary plaintiff.
Had either of these solutions existed, Ethicon, Inc. would likely have been
resolved differently. If the guidelines were present when the patent was
drafted and filed, Yoon would have examined closely whether Choi was an
inventor and avoided the problem by receiving an assignment of rights from
him. Alternatively, if involuntary joinder was allowed, Ethicon would have
likely won the case for past infringement, though it would not have received
damages for future infringement, in light of Choi's assignment to U.S.
Surgical.
165 FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a).
16 See Carlson & Barney, supra note 146, at 10 (asking "when one considers that each joint owner
already has the ability to unilaterally prejudice the pecuniary interests of the other owners.., why
shouldn't they also be at the mercy of each other with respect to unilateral enforcement actions[?]").
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The result of Ethicon, Inc., in which an originally unnamed co-inventor
is able to unilaterally invalidate the patent, demonstrates that remedies to this
problem are needed. Under the first proposed solution, Congress and/or the
PTO should promulgate more specific guidelines for determining
inventorship. Even if the PTO or Congress does not promulgate such
guidelines at the time of filing and throughout the prosecution of a patent
application, patent attorneys should work with their clients to analyze the
role individuals played in the conception of the claimed subject matter. In
light of Ethicon, Inc., much care should be taken in making a correct
determination of inventorship before the patent issues. Under the second
proposed solution, the courts should join non-consenting co-owners as
involuntary plaintiffs. The patent system, which was created to promote
advances in science and engineering by granting a limited monopoly to
inventors, does not serve its purpose when inventors lose patent rights due
to such technical errors. Though alleging inventorship at the time of filing
a patent application is done by simply signing a declaration, one must be
careful to ensure that the correct inventorship is stated to avoid practical
invalidation of a patent.
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